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LYING TO CATCH THE BAD GUY:
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S LIKELY ADOPTION
OF THE CLEAR ERROR STANDARD OF REVIEW
FOR A DENIAL OF A FRANKS HEARING
INTRODUCTION
The authorities knock on a door of a residence. When the door
opens, the officers show a search warrant to search the premises.
During the search, the officers seize several pieces of evidence.
However, a closer look at the search warrant reveals that the
magistrate judge issued it based on misleading information. The
affiant fabricated the information provided for the issuance of the
search warrant. Can a defendant challenge the veracity of the
information supporting the issuance of the search warrant even after
the authorities obtain the incriminating evidence? Or is the defendant
forced to defend against evidence obtained only because of a search
warrant based on false information?
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.'
In light of the Fourth Amendment requiring the issuance of a
warrant only "upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched," the Supreme
Court developed a hearing to determine if the warrant meets these
criteria in the Franks case, subsequently called a "Franks" hearing.
2
Upon denial of a defendant's right to a Franks hearing, the circuit
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) and infra Part H.A.
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courts are split as to the proper standard of review for an appellate
court's review of the district court's findings. 3 As noted recently in
U.S. v. Arbolaez, the Eleventh Circuit has yet to determine its precise
standard of review.4
This Note will present an overview of a Franks hearing, including
the standards of review adopted by the circuits and will explain why
the Eleventh Circuit will likely adopt the clear error standard of
review.5 Specifically, Part I will address the Fourth Amendment and
its application to search warrants.6 Part II will discuss a Franks
hearing as applied to the Fourth Amendment by the Supreme Court in
Franks v. Delaware.7 Part III will discuss the Eleventh Circuit's
current standing on the issue and will give an overview of the
different standards of review used by appellate courts.8 Part IV will
explain the three most common standards of review as applied to a
Franks hearing, the circuits that have adopted each standard, and
their reasoning for their adoption.9 Finally, Part V will discuss why
the Eleventh Circuit will likely adopt the clear error standard in
reviewing a denial of a Franks hearing by the district court.' 0
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLICATION
A. An Overview
As noted, the Fourth Amendment grants all individuals freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures and warrants issued without
probable cause, without oath or affirmation, and without describing
with particularity the place to be searched. 1 As such, the Fourth
3. See infra Part IV.
4. United States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283, 1293 (11 th Cir. 2006).
5. See infra Parts II-V.
6. See infra Part 1.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part HI.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
[Vol. 24:843
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CLEAR ERROR FOR DENIAL OF FRANKS HEARING
Amendment is a restraint only upon actions by state and federal
government officials.12
B. Fourth Amendment's Application to Search and Seizure
A warrant allows "an impartial judicial officer to assess whether
the police have probable cause to make an arrest or conduct a
search.' 13  The Fourth Amendment grants protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 14 The exclusionary rule prevents
evidence that has been illegally seized from being admitted in a
criminal trial. 15 If investigators think that probable cause exists to
search a premise to confiscate evidence to use against a defendant at
the defendant's trial, the investigators must present evidence
supporting the warrant's issuance before a magistrate judge. 16 The
affidavit or sworn testimony must establish the grounds for issuing
the warrant.1
7
12. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1921) (finding the Fourth Amendment
inapplicable when a former employee took papers incriminating a discharged employee from office). In
some circumstances, its restraints extend to actions by foreign government officials. Compare United
States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436,455-56 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to
a search carried out by foreign officials if the circumstances surrounding the search did not "shock the
conscience"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832 (1982), and United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139 (5th
Cir. 1976) (holding that the Fourth Amendment generally does not apply to foreign governmental
officials, except when the actions "shock the judicial conscience" or when the exclusionary rule applies
because American law enforcement authorities participate in the search), with United States v. Mount,
757 F.2d 1315, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule inapplicable
in a foreign search because no United States official participated).
13. Frederick Alexander & John L. Amsden, Sixteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:
United States Supreme Courts and Courts of Appeals 1985-1986: Investigation and Police Practices, 75
GEO. L.J. 713, 727-28 (1987). However, warrantless searches are, in some instances, allowed. See Peter
J. Kocoras, Comment, The Proper Appellate Standard of Review for Probable Cause to Issue a Search
Warrant, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1413, 1424-25 (1993). "Although warrantless searches are presumptively
unreasonable, the Supreme Court recognizes several exceptions to the presumption." These exceptions
include: automobiles if probable cause exists, searches in residences if exigent circumstances and
probable cause exist, or if a property owner consents to the search. Id.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. Paul Simon, Comment, The Fourth Amendment's Exclusionary Rule-Judicial Remedy Or
Constitutional Mandate: Is There Room For The "Good Faith" Exception?, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1101,
1114 (2000).
16. Kocoras, supra note 13, at 1423.
17. Id.
20081
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The Fourth Amendment further requires that the grounds for
issuance of a search warrant exist only upon a showing of probable
cause.' 8 Probable cause exists if "at the moment the arrest was made,
the officers had probable cause to make it-whether at that moment
the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a
prudent man in believing that the [arrestee] had committed or was
committing an offense."' 19 The magistrate judge makes this
determination by looking at all of the facts in the "totality of the
circumstances." 20  Suspicion in itself is insufficient to establish
probable cause.2'
If the judge determines that probable cause exists based on the
affidavits or testimony of the affiant seeking a search warrant he may
grant the warrant, but the warrant must "identify the person or
property to be searched, identify any person or property to be seized,
and designate the magistrate judge to whom it must be returned., 22
II. FRANKS v. DELAWARE 2
3
The Supreme Court in Franks v. Delaware forged new ground in
its holding that a criminal defendant in certain circumstances may
challenge the information in a search warrant.24
A. An Overview
Probable cause is only one factor in determining the need to
suppress the evidence gathered pursuant to a search warrant.25 The
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Hensley, 713 F.2d 220, 222 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding
that .'every arrest' and every seizure having the essential attributes of a formal arrest, is unreasonable
unless it is supported by probable cause") (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981)).
19. See United States v. Ayres, 725 F.2d 806, 809 (Ist Cir. 1984) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 91 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. United States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 455 (8th Cir. 1984).
21. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); United States v. Algie, 721 F.2d 1039, 1043
(6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
22. FED. R. CRIm. P. 41(e)(2XA).
23. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
24. See id. at 172.
[Vol. 24:843
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Supreme Court in Franks v. Delaware found that it is also possible to
suppress the evidence gathered pursuant to a search warrant by
successfully challenging the veracity of a sworn statement used by
police to procure the search warrant.
26
1. Facts
In Franks, affidavits from the police supported the issuance of a
search warrant to search the home of Jerome Franks. 27 On March 5,
1976, Mrs. Cynthia Bailey told police a man confronted her with a
knife and sexually assaulted her earlier that morning in her home.
28
She gave the police a detailed description of both the man's physical
characteristics and his clothing, saying that he wore a white thermal
undershirt, black pants with a silver or gold buckle, a brown leather
three-quarter-length coat, and a dark knit cap that covered his eyes.
29
The police took Franks into custody that same day for an assault on
another female. 30 Two detectives as affiants submitted a sworn
statement to the justice of the peace in support of a search warrant to
search Franks's apartment. 3 1 The affidavit noted the description of
the assailant given by Bailey to the police and declared that one of
the detectives contacted two other employees at Franks's place of
business who revealed that Franks' normal dress consisted of a white
knit thermal undershirt, a brown leather jacket, and a dark green knit
hat.3
2
25. See United States v. Fields, No. 98-5798, 2000 WL 1140557, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Aug. 4, 2000)
(determining first whether there was probable cause by reviewing the factual findings for clear error and
the legal conclusions de novo, then determining whether the district court properly denied the right to a
Franks hearing under the de novo standard of review).
26. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155.
27. Id. at 157.
28. Id. at 156.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Franks, 438 U.S. at 157.
32. Id.
20081
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2. The Arguments
Based on the information the detectives gave, the magistrate issued
the search warrant.33 In searching Franks's apartment, police found
and took into evidence a white thermal undershirt, a knit hat, dark
pants, a leather jacket, and a single-blade knife.34 Franks's counsel
filed a motion to suppress the evidence and alleged that the warrant
was a violation of Franks's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
as the warrant did not show probable cause on its face. 35 Later,
Franks's counsel amended the motion alleging that false information
was the basis of the search warrant.
36
Franks's counsel further requested to call Detective Brooks and the
two employees at Franks' place of business as witnesses. 37 He
asserted that the two employees would testify that neither were
personally interviewed by Detective Brooks or Detective Gray and
any information they gave to police was "somewhat different" from
the information stated in the affidavit.38 Further, his counsel alleged
that the misstatements in the affidavit were in "bad faith" and not
merely inadvertent.39
The State countered that "any challenge to a search warrant was to
be limited to questions of sufficiency based on the face of the
affidavit . . . .0 The State further argued based on Rugendorf v.
United States41 that the alleged factual inaccuracies in the affidavit
"were of only peripheral relevancy to the showing of probable cause,
and, not being within the personal knowledge of the affiant, did not
go to the integrity of the affidavit. ' 42 Finally, the "State objected to
petitioners' going behind [the warrant affidavit] in any way, and
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 157-58.
36. Id. at 158.




41. Rugendorfv. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
42. Franks, 438 U.S. at 160 (quoting Rugendorfv. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 532 (1964)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 24:843
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argued that the court must decide the petitioners' motion on the four
comers of the affidavit.
'A3
The trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence, and the
State used the evidence secured by the search warrant at Frank's
trial. 44 Franks was convicted of rape, kidnapping, and burglary.45 The




In reviewing the case, the United States Supreme Court noted that
"[w]hether the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the
derivative exclusionary rule . . . ever mandate that a defendant be
permitted to attack the veracity of a warrant affidavit after the
warrant has been issued and executed, is a question that encounters
conflicting values." 47 The Court found that the wording of the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant Clause "surely takes the affiant's good faith
as its premise;" thus, in certain circumstances the veracity of a
warrant may be challenged. a Specifically, the Court considered the
wording of the Warrant Clause which states, "[N]o Warrants shall
[be] issue[d], but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation... . '49
The Court looked further at Judge Frankel's statement in United
States v. Halsey: "[When] the Fourth Amendment demands a factual
showing sufficient to comprise 'probable cause,' the obvious
assumption is that there will be a truthful showing." 50 However, the
Court emphasized that not every fact recited in the affidavit must be
completely accurate, but that "the information put forth is believed or
43. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Franks v. Delaware, 373 A.2d 578, 580 (Del. 1977).
47. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Franks, 438 U.S. at 164-65 (quoting United States v. Halsey, 257 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (S.D.N.Y.
1966)) (emphasis in original).
20081
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appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.",51 The Court went on to
say:
It is established law that a warrant affidavit must set forth
particular facts and circumstances underlying the existence of
probable cause, so as to allow the magistrate to make an
independent evaluation of the matter. If an informant's tip is the
source of the information, the affidavit must recite some of the
underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded
that relevant evidence might be discovered, and some of the
underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that
the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, . . . was
credible or his information reliable. Because it is the magistrate
who must determine independently whether there is probable
cause, it would be an unthinkable imposition upon his authority
if a warrant affidavit, revealed after the fact to contain a
deliberately or reckless false statement, were to stand beyond
impeachment. 2
In response to concerns by the State, the Court noted that the rule
announced in the case had a limited scope "both in regard to when
exclusion of the seized evidence is mandated, and when a hearing on
allegations of misstatements must be accorded., 53 But, the Court
found that the considerations in favor of a total ban on post-search
impeachment of veracity were "insufficient to justify an absolute ban
on post-search impeachment of veracity." 54 Thus, the Supreme Court
held that certain circumstances mandate an evidentiary hearing if a
defendant challenges the veracity of statements contained in an
affidavit.55
51. Id. at 165.
52. Franks, 438 U.S. at 165 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
53. Id. at 167.
54. Id; see infra Part U.C (discussing the policy considerations in favor of a Franks hearing).
55. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72.
[Vol. 24:843
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B. The Franks Hearing Currently
Following Franks v. Delaware, defendants now have a right to
challenge the veracity of a search warrant. 56 Hence, subsequent to the
seizure of evidence, the defendant has the right to make the
challenge. 57 Subsequent cases have allowed the objecting party to
make this challenge as a pretrial motion.58 If the trial court grants the
motion, a defendant receives a Franks hearing where the court
determines the validity of a search warrant.59 However, this showing
is not a simple one to make.
60
1. Requirements
The defendant must offer substantial proof of allegations of
"deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth. 61 To
succeed in this showing, "the defendant must present reliable proof
sufficient to establish a material falsity by a preponderance of the
evidence." 62 The First Circuit extends Franks to find that "material
omissions" may also necessitate a Franks hearing.
63
The Seventh Circuit further requires that the defendant "must offer
direct evidence of the affiant's state of mind or inferential evidence
that the affiant had obvious reasons for omitting facts in order to
prove deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard."64 Mere negligence
56. Id. at 156.
57. Kocoras, supra note 13, at 1423.
58. See generally United States v. Harris, 464 F.3d 733, 736 (7th Cir. 2006).
59. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 156.
60. See infra Part I.B.
61. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171; Compare United States v. Chesher, 678 F.2d 1353, 1361-62 (9th Cir.
1982) (finding that a preliminary showing of reckless disregard for the truth occurs when the defendant
can show that the government affiant has ready access to more reliable and accurate information), with
United States v. Phillips, 727 F.2d 392, 400 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding that defendant's conclusory
allegations do not create substantial proof), and United States v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1089 (2d
Cir. 1984) (finding that defendant's failure to offer proof of affiant's intentional or reckless disregard for
the truth or to submit "a sworn or otherwise reliable statement of a witness" justified the denial of a
Franks hearing).
62. 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 177 (2006).
63. United States v. Rumney, 867 F.2d 714, 720 (1st Cir. 1989).
64. United States v. Skinner, 972 F.2d 171, 177 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. McNesse,
901 F.2d 585, 594 (7th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Roth,
201 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2000).
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or innocent mistake is insufficient to warrant a Franks hearing. 65
Further, the "impeachment... permitted... is only that of the affiant,
not of any nongovernmental informant."
66
The defendant cannot simply argue that the affidavit was false;
"[h]e must point to specific false statements that he claims were made
intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. '67 He must
"provide supporting affidavits or explain their absence." 68 The
defendant must also show that the challenged statement was essential
to the magistrate's finding of probable cause.
69
If these requirements are met, "and if, when material that is the
subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side
...the remaining content is insufficient [to support a finding of
probable cause], the defendant is entitled, under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, to his hearing." 70 Even when the facts
indicate deliberate or reckless falsities, the defendant is not entitled to
a Franks hearing if probable cause still exists when the court
disregards challenged statements.
71
In sum, to obtain a Franks hearing to determine the validity of the
search warrant affidavit, the "defendant must make a substantial
preliminary showing: (1) that [the] affidavit contained some material
false statement; (2) that [the] affiant made this false statement
intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth; and (3) that the
65. United States v. Reed, 726 F.2d 339, 342 (7th Cir, 1984) (finding that allegations that police
failed to verify accuracy of detailed tip furnished by previously reliable informant before obtaining and
executing a search warrant amounted to an "allegation of negligence or innocent mistake," which was
insufficient tojustify a Franks hearing).
66. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
67. United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 1990).
68. Id.
69. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72; see also United States v. Rumney, 867 F.2d 714, 720 (1st Cir. 1989)
(holding that even assuming the omissions must have been made knowingly or at least recklessly there
was still probable cause to issue the search warrant); Marvin v. United States, 732 F.2d 669, 672 (8th
Cir. 1984) (finding a warrant was not invalidated if the omission was not essential to a finding of
probable cause).
70. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72.
71. Brian Serr, Criminal Procedure, 29 TEX. TECH L. REv. 547, 560 (1998).
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To avoid the jury confusing the issue of the defendant's guilt with
the State's potential misconduct, the hearing is conducted outside the
presence of the jury." At the Franks hearing, if the defendant proves
his allegations by "a preponderance of the evidence" and if the
remaining affidavits are insufficient to support a finding of probable
cause, the court must declare the warrant invalid and exclude "the
fruits of the search.., as if probable cause was lacking on the face of
the affidavit., 74 However, the Franks hearing itself is not without its
limitations.75 The affidavit supporting the search warrant is presumed
valid.76
C. Policy Considerations in Favor of a Franks Hearing
The Supreme Court in Franks mentioned policy considerations in
finding a right to the hearing.77 First, the Court found that the
wording "'but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation,' would be reduced to a nullity if a police officer was able
to use deliberately falsified allegations to demonstrate probable
cause, and, having misled the magistrate, then was able to remain
confident that the ploy was worthwhile." 78 As the hearing before a
magistrate is frequently done hastily in order to avoid losing
72. Wanda E. Wakefield, Annotation, Disputation of Truth of Matters Stated in Affidavit in Support
of Search Warrant-Modern Cases, 24 A.L.R. 4th 1266 (1983) (citing United States v. Maro, 272 F.3d
817 (7th Cir. 2001)).
73. Franks, 438 U.S. at 170.
74. Franks, 438 U.S. at 156.
75. See Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F.2d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 1982) (Franks hearings
are not available when allegations concern a magistrate's misstatement in an affidavit).
76. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
77. See infra Part B.C.
78. Franks, 438 U.S. at 168.
20081
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 853 2007-2008





   
 .73 s  
    
     
t   
rch . f 
it., 74 ks   
 it  t  
7  
.  siderations r  ing 
 r  rt i  ks ti  li  i ti   
 7  
i  ' t  t   
tion,'    
t     
, , i  i l  t  ,   
t l .,,78    
  
.  . fi l , t ti , i tation f t   tters t t  i  ffi it  t 
  t- odem ses, . . . 3) c  
   I »  
. s,  . . t . 
ks, .  
.  i   . .  ,  ,5  ranks  
r  t il l   ll ti    '  i t t t i    
. r  . l r ,  . . ,1  ( ). 
.   II  
. r ks,  . . t . 
11
Southerland: Lying to Catch the Bad Guy:  The Eleventh Circuit's Likely Adopti
Published by Reading Room, 2008
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
evidence, the Supreme Court also found that the hearing itself would
not always "suffice to discourage lawless or reckless misconduct." 7
9
Next, the Court found that alternative sanctions, including perjury
prosecution, administrative discipline, contempt, or a civil suit, would
be unlikely to deter false information. 80 Third, "[a] magistrate's
determination is presently subject to review before trial as to
sufficiency without any undue interference with the dignity of the
magistrate's function." 81 Finally, the Court could "see no principled
basis for distinguishing between the question of the sufficiency of an
affidavit, which also is subject to a post-search re-examination, and
the question of its integrity.,
82
D. Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
The decision in Franks was not without dissent.83 In his dissent,
Justice Rehnquist urged that courts should not be "halting or
tentative" in determining whether to incarcerate a person.84 He noted,
"The fact that it was obtained by reason of an impeachable warrant
bears not at all on the innocence or guilt of the accused., 85
III. THE ISSUE
A. The Eleventh Circuit's Current Standing
The Eleventh Circuit recently noted in United States v. Arbolaez
86
that the considerations regarding a Franks hearing are not clear
among the circuits. 87 The court considered whether the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida erred when it
refused to have a pretrial Franks hearing after acknowledging that the
79. Id. at 169.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 169-70 (emphasis in the original).
82. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.
83. Id. at 180-88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 182 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 184 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86. United States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283 (11 th Cir. 2006).
87. Id. at 1293.
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State's witness denied giving statements used to obtain a search
warrant.
88
The government agents in Arbolaez obtained and executed a search
warrant for Arbolaez's residence after receiving information from
Arbolaez's tenant indicating where incriminating evidence could be
found.89 Looking to Franks, the court noted that a defendant may
challenge the veracity of an affidavit in support of a search warrant if
he makes a "'substantial preliminary showing' that: (1) the affiant
deliberately or recklessly included false statements, or failed to
include material information, in the affidavit; and (2) the challenged
statement or omission was essential to the finding of probable
cause."90 After the execution of the search warrant, the tenant denied
making the statements that were the foundation for the warrant.
9 1
The court recognized that holding an evidentiary hearing lies
within its sound discretion and will be reviewed only for an abuse of
that discretion. 92 The Eleventh Circuit also noted that it had not stated
a precise standard of review for a denial of a Franks hearing and
acknowledged that other circuits were split on the standard as well.
93
It avoided setting the standard of review by instead finding that,
because the "more exacting de novo standard" was satisfied, the court
did not need to further address the issue.
94
The following sections will discuss the different standards and the
circuits that have adopted each and will attempt to predict the
Eleventh Circuit's likely choice.
88. Id. at 1289.
89. Id. at 1287.
90. Id. at 1293.
91. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d at 1293.
92. Id. at 1293.
93. Id. (citing United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 304 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussing the split);
United States v. Fairchild, 122 F.3d 605, 610 (8th Cir. 1997) (review for abuse of discretion); United
States v. Homick, 964 F.2d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 1992) (de novo review); United States v. Skinner, 972
F.2d 171, 177 (7th Cir. 1992) (review for clear error); United States v. Hadfield, 918 F.2d 987, 992 (1st
Cir 1990) (review for clear error); United States v. One Parcel of Property, 897 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir.
1990) (review for clear error); United States v. Mueller, 902 F.2d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 1990) (de novo
review)).
94. Arbolaez, 450 F.2d at 1293 (citing United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 304 (6th Cir. 2002)).
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B. The Differing Standards
In determining the proper standard of review for a denial of a
Franks hearing, it is crucial to understand the distinctions between
the possible standards. The standard of review in any given case is
the "degree of deference given by the reviewing court to the decision
under review." 95 In other words, this standard is the "power of the
lens" an appellate court looks through in reviewing the issues of a
case. 96 With the standard of review and before overturning the
decision of the trial court, the appellate court is able to determine
"'how wrong' the trial court must be before its decision may be
overturned.,
97
Appellate judges usually consider decisions as either questions of
law or questions of fact.98 For questions of law, an appellate court
generally uses the de novo standard of review, 99while for questions of
fact the court generally uses the clear error standard.'00
The difference between questions of law and questions of fact may
be merely a "simple dichotomy."'' 1 "'[F]acts' are those findings that
'generally respond to inquiries about who, when, what, and where'
. . . Statements of 'law,' on the other hand, are 'fact-free general
principles that are applicable to all, or at least to many, disputes and
not simply to the one sub judice.""0 2
1. De Novo Standard
The de novo standard of review is the most stringent standard used
by a reviewing court as it "assumes that the reviewing court is 'the
95. Timothy P. O'Neill, Standards of Review in Illinois Criminal Cases: The Need for Major
Reform, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 51, 52 (1992) (quoting Martha S. Davis & Steven A. Childress, Standards of
Review in Criminal Appeals: Fifth Circuit Illustration and Analysis, 60 TUL. L. REv. 461, 465 (1986))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id. at 52.
97. Id.
98. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988).
99. See infra Part III.B. 1. (discussing the de novo standard of review).
100. See infra Part I1l.B.3. (discussing the clear error standard of review).
101. O'Neill, supra note 95, at 55.
102. O'Neill, supra note 95, at 55-56 (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85
COLUM.L.REV. 229, 235 (1985)).
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front-line judicial authority. ,,103 Hence, the reviewing court gives the
lower court's determinations no deference in determining its ruling in
a case.' 0 4 The reviewing court is capable of replacing the trial court's
judgment with its own. 10 5
2. Review for Abuse of Discretion
"Abuse of discretion is the standard used when an appellate court
is reviewing discretionary decisions made by a trial court."'1 6 A
reviewing court finds that the trial court abused its discretion when
the trial court failed "to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal
discretion that is clearly against logic."' 1 7 Courts equate the review
for an abuse of discretion to the clear error standard of review.
10 8
3. Clear Error
In applying the clear error standard of review, unless the findings
of fact were clearly erroneous, the reviewing court gives deference to
the lower court's findings. 10 9 A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
"when although there is evidence to support [the finding], the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."' 10
This standard significantly defers to the lower court's
determinations.' "Under clear error review, an appellate court may
not reverse findings of fact by a district court merely because the
103. Kocoras, supra note 13, at 1416 (quoting United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 418 (7th Cir.
1990) (Posner, J., concurring)).
104. Id.
105. O'Neill, supra note 95, at 54.
106. Heidi M. Westby, Comment, Fourth Amendment Seizure: The Proper Standard for Appellate
Review, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 829, 834 (1992).
107. Kocoras, supra note 13, at 1416 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 10 (6th ed. 1990)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1415 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
110. O'Neill, supra note 95, at 55 (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 285 n.14
(1982)).
111. Kocoras, supranote 13, at 1415.
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appellate court may have made different factual findings or
interpreted the same evidence differently."
11 2
IV. CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT
As noted in United States v. Arbolaez, there is a circuit split on the
issue of the proper standard of review for a district court's denial of a
Franks hearing. 113 Given the Supreme Court's finding that the review
for abuse of discretion standard is equivalent to the clear error
standard of review, as well as the Eighth Circuit's use of both
standards interchangeably, 1 4 only the two most prevalent standards
adopted by the circuits, the de novo standard of review and the clear
error standard of review, will be discussed.1
1 5
A. De Novo Standard
The Fifth 1 6 and Ninth117 Circuits have adopted the most stringent
de novo standard of review. The magistrate in United States v.
Mueller 1 8 granted a search warrant because the investigating officers
stated that they smelled methamphetamines across the defendant's
fence." 9
In searching the premises, the officers seized a fully operational
methamphetamine laboratory and various weapons, and arrested John
112, Id. at 1415-16n.19.
113. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
114. Kocoras, supra note 13, at 1416; Compare United States v. Hiveley, 61 F.3d 1358, 1360 (8th Cir.
1995) (using a review for abuse of discretion standard to determine that despite the inaccuracies in the
affidavit used to obtain the search warrant, there was still probable cause to believe that the search
would surface marijuana or other evidence of drug trafficking), with United States v. Buchanan, 985
F.2d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir. 1993) (using the clear error standard's totality of the evidence approach to find
no error in denying the Franks hearing because the officer who gave the information believed it to be
true and correct in giving it to the affiant).
115. See infra Part IV.A-B.
116. See United States v. Mueller, 902 F.2d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 1990), denial of post-conviction relief
vacated by 168 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 1999).
117. See United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1237 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Shryock,
342 F.3d 948, 975 (9th Ci. 2003); United States v. Homick, 964 F.2d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 1992).
118. United States v. Mueller, 902 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1990).
119. Idat339.
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C. Mueller along with two others.120 Mueller's motion to suppress
was denied by the district court. 12 1 Pursuant to a plea agreement,
"Mueller pleaded guilty to the manufacture of methamphetamine...
conditioned on his ability to appeal the denial of his suppression
motion."122
Mueller argued on appeal that his denial of an evidentiary hearing
pursuant to Franks v. Delaware was in error. 123 Mueller argued that
following Franks, the addresses given for the warrant were not
sufficiently specific, the officer's affidavit used as a basis for the
warrant did not sufficiently establish his ability to identify by smell
the methamphetamine, and "that any odor smelled by the officer
could not have been connected with the residence searched."'
124
The court disagreed with Mueller and upheld the district court's
finding that Mueller was properly denied his right to a Franks
hearing. 12 5 A de novo review of the facts indicated that incorrect
addresses in the affidavit did not show any falsehood whatsoever.
126
The officer's statements in establishing his ability and expertise to
identify the smell of the methamphetamine provided a sufficient basis
for the conclusion that the officer could reasonably recognize the
smell of methamphetamine as he claimed. 12 The fact that he did not
specifically state that he recognized the smell because of his
experience did not show that his statements were false, nor did it
establish intentional or reckless disregard for the truth.1
28
Further, even though the officer did not establish "every element of
his reasoning process," the evidence failed to show that that there was





124. Mueller, 902 F.2d at 339.
125. Id. at 341-43.
126. Id. at 341.
127. Id. at 342.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 329 (5th Cir. 1980) (extending Franks "to
material omissions made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth.")).
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not have smelled methamphetamine based on a professor's statement
that the ability to smell the methamphetamine was "very unlikely."''
30
The court found that the professor's statement represented a
qualification of his judgment and did not amount to a "substantial
preliminary showing that [the officer] made any misrepresentation in
stating that he smelled methamphetamine from across the fence,
much less a substantial preliminary showing of intentional or reckless
misrepresentation." 131
The Ninth Circuit likewise refused to defer to the lower court's
reasoning and adopted the de novo standard of review. 132 Some
courts, including the Sixth Circuit, use the de novo standard to review
the denial of the right to the Franks hearing and use the clear error
standard to review determinations as to underlying issues of fact. 1
33
The de novo standard's denial of any deference to the lower court
stems from the reasoning that in the "fast paced" trial system, "trial
judges often must resolve complicated legal questions without benefit
of 'extended reflection' or 'extensive information. ' ' ' 134 Trial court
counsel face various time pressures in a trial and are often unable to
spend significant amounts of time researching for legal memoranda
and briefs to educate judges on the law. 135 Supporting circuits find
that courts of appeal are in a better position to produce accurate legal
decisions by applying a de novo standard of review because at this
point in the litigation process, "the factual record has been
constructed by the district court and settled for purposes of appellate
review."'136 Further, appellate judges usually sit in panels of three,
130. Mueller, 902 F.2d at 342.
131. Id. at 343.
132. See United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1237; (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Shryock,
342 F.3d 948, 975 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Homick, 964 F.2d 899,904 (9th Cir. 1992).
133. See United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 505 (6th Cir. 2001).
134. Kocoras, supra note 13, at 1418 (quoting Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232
(1991)).
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991)); see also O'Neill, supra
note 95, at 54 (stating why a de novo review standard is "an appropriate power for appellate courts
reviewing questions of law.").
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versus only one judge at the trial level, thereby minimizing possible
error. 1
37
B. Clear Error Standard
The First,138 Second,139 and Seventh 140 Circuits have adopted a
clear error standard of review. Consequently, these appellate courts
give the most deference to a lower court's reasoning.141
In United States v. Roth, 142 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
used a clear error standard of review to affirm the lower court's
denial of the defendant's right to a Franks hearing. 143 Using
information from an informant that the defendant Gary Roth grew
marijuana in his pig barn, the magistrate judge issued a search
warrant. 144 In searching the premises, agents found enough evidence
to charge Roth with "conspiracy to manufacture and distribute
marijuana, possession with intent to manufacture marijuana, and
criminal forfeiture .... ,145 Roth filed a motion for a Franks
hearing.146 However, the magistrate judge denied this motion and
Roth entered a guilty plea.
147
On appeal, Roth argued that he was entitled to a Franks hearing to
determine the validity of the search warrant. 148 However, the court
found in reviewing the lower court's ruling for clear error that Franks
only applies if the state of mind of the affiant is at issue. 149 Roth only
137. O'Neill, supra note 95, at 54.
138. See United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 747 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Hadfield, 918
F.2d 987, 992 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Rumney, 867 F.2d 714, 720 (1st Cir. 1989).
139. See United States v. One Parcel of Property, 897 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1990).
140. See United States v. Childs, 447 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2006); Zarnbrella v. United States, 327
F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Maro, 272 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Roth, 201 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. McClellan, 165 F.3d 535, 545 (7th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Skinner, 972 F.2d 171, 177 (7th Cir. 1992).
141. Kocoras, supra note 13, at 1413.
142. United States v. Roth, 201 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2000).
143. Id. at 891.
144. Id. at 890-91.
145. Id. at 889-91.
146. Id. at 891.
147. Roth, 201 F.3d at 891.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 892.
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challenged the statements made by the informant, and did not
challenge whether the officer acting as the affiant for the purposes of
the search warrant included untrue statements "in his supporting
affidavit despite his knowledge that they were false or with reckless
disregard for the truth."'150 Hence, the court affirmed the lower court,
and denied the Franks hearing.I 5'
Using the clear error standard of review allows courts to use a
totality of the circumstances approach. 52 It also allows courts to
adhere to the presumption that the affidavit supporting the warrant is
valid.153 Further, judicial error is minimized because the trial court is
better able to evaluate and weigh evidence than the appellate court. 54
The trial court, unlike the appellate court, can "hear live evidence
and evaluate the credibility of live witnesses . . . ,155 In applying the
clear error standard of review, the appellate court is "relieved of the
burden of a complete and independent evidentiary review, thereby
enabling appellate judges to devote more of their time and energy to
reviewing questions of law."' 156
V. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S LIKELY DECISION
Despite some arguments in favor of the de novo standard of
review, the Eleventh Circuit will likely adopt the clear error standard
of review for a denial of a Franks hearing given that the arguments in




152. See United States v. Rumney, 867 F.2d 714, 719 (lst Cir. 1989).
153. See United States v. McClellan, 165 F.3d 535, 545 (7th Cir. 1999).
154. Kocoras, supra note 13, at 1417.
155. O'Neill, supra note 95, at 55.
156. Kocoras, supra note 13, at 1417.
157. See infra Part V.A-C.
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A. Factual Arguments for the Clear Error Standard of Review for
Denial of a Franks Hearing
First, the decision to grant a Franks hearing is one based on the
particular facts of the case, and is not a question of law. 158 The
defendant in United States v. Mancari159 disputed the court's
application of the clear error standard of review in its determination
of whether the lower court correctly denied the Franks hearing. 160 He
argued that this approach was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in Ornelas v. United States.
16 1
Although Ornelas emphasized "that historical findings of fact,
either in support of a warrant or in support of an action without a
warrant, are entitled to deference,"'162 the Supreme Court nonetheless
concluded that "'independent appellate review of these ultimate
determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause' is
necessary in order to permit appellate courts to apply consistent legal
standards." 163 Mancari clarified Ornelas and found a showing that a
warrant based on falsities "requires an examination of historical facts,
not the eventual legal determination that any given set of facts add up
to probable cause for the issuance of the warrant;" thereby, affirming
the clear error standard and declining to adopt the de novo standard
of review.
164
Further, the clear error standard of review allows the court to use a
"totality of the circumstances" approach to determine if, besides the
alleged omissions or misstatements, the totality of the circumstances
reveals that probable cause still exists.1 65 This approach is consistent
with any other challenge to a finding of probable cause.1
66
158. United States v. Mancari, 463 F.3d 590, 593 (7th Cir. 2006).
159. Id. at 590.
160. Id. at 593.
161. Id. (citing Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996)).
162. Id. (discussing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996)).
163. Id. (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996)).
164. Mancari, 463 F.3d at 594.
165. See United States v. Kinstler, 812 F.2d 522, 525 (9th Cir. 1987).
166. See id.
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The argument that the clear error standard is unjust because of its
high burden on a defendant is misplaced. 167 The Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Harris used the clear error standard of review to
determine that the lower court incorrectly denied the defendant a
Franks hearing.' 68 Defendant Anthony Harris challenged the veracity
of the information provided to a magistrate by the affiant, Detective
Forrest, who conducted surveillance of the defendant's home after
receiving a tip that the defendant and his brother were selling cocaine
and then seeing the defendant and his brother coming and going from
the home. 169 Further, Detective Forrest stated that a confidential
informant told him that he observed the defendant and his brother in
possession of cocaine. 1
70
Harris submitted an affidavit from the Department of Corrections
verifying that his brother was incarcerated on the date in question.,'
7
Further, Harris submitted a sworn affidavit that he was not present at
the residence on the day that the confidential informant stated. 172 The
district court found that Detective Forrest did in fact make intentional
or reckless false statements and omissions and that the "omissions,
both individually and in their cumulative effect, suggest an
intentional design to create an incorrect or at least misleading
impression that the evidence relied upon to obtain the warrant was
more current than it actually was."'173 Although the court found such
falsities, the court denied Harris his right to a Franks hearing because
it determined that the misstatements were not material to a finding of
probable cause.'74
The appellate court, in reviewing the decision of the district court
for clear error, reasoned that "there [was] little corroborative weight
to the evidence remaining in the affidavit after the misrepresentations
167. See infra notes 168-178 and accompanying text.
168. United States v. Harris, 464 F.3d 733, 737-41 (7th Cir. 2006).





174. Harris, 464 F.3d at 737-38.
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[were] severed.' ' 175 The court recognized that a good-faith exception
may apply in some circumstances, but not where the facts indicate
that the officer seeking the affidavit was "dishonest or reckless" in
seeking the search warrant. 176 Therefore, the lower court incorrectly
denied Harris his right to a Franks hearing. 177 Although the clear
error standard of review required that Harris make a strong showing,
it was a hurdle that he did overcome.
178
B. Policy Concerns in Favor of the Clear Error Standard of Review
Policy rationales exist in favor of adopting the clear error standard
of review. First, an appellate court's deference to the magistrate
encourages police officials to submit investigations to the
independence of the judicial process and, therefore, to secure
warrants before conducting searches. 179 The Supreme Court found
that "[a] grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward
warrants" will tend to discourage police officers and "courts should
not invalidate warrant[s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a
hypertechnical, rather than commonsense, manner."'180 Franks v.
Delaware articulated the presumption that the affidavit supporting a
warrant is valid.' 8' Using the clearly erroneous-totality of the
circumstances standard of review does not undercut the presumption
in favor of the validity of the search warrant. 18
2
Second, the "clear error review minimizes judicial error because
the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to
evaluate and weigh the evidence."' 83 Courts find that "'as a matter of
the sound administration of justice,"' deference was owed to the
175. Id. at 740.
176. Id. (citing United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that "[a]n officer's
decision to obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence that he or she was acting in good faith.").
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236-37 (1983).
180. Id. at 236 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965)).
181. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
182. See State v. Steen, 536 S.E.2d 1, 11 (N.C. 2000).
183. Kocoras, supra note 13, at 1417.
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"'judicial actor. . . better positioned than another to decide the issue
in question.,,1'84 Courts maintain consistency by using the de novo
standard of review for legal issues surrounding the probable cause
element of a search warrant, while giving proper deference to the
district court through use of the clear error standard on questions of
fact related to the Franks hearing.1
8 5
C. Arguments For and Against the De Novo Standard of Review for
Denial of a Franks Hearing
Despite the Eleventh Circuit's likely adoption of the clear error
standard of review, there exist arguments in favor of application of
the de novo standard of review or, possibly, the de novo with due
deference.
Some argue, with respect to probable cause, an appellate court is
not at an advantage over the magistrate judge in deciding whether
there was probable cause, so it makes sense to give the lower court
deference. 186 On the other hand, as to a Franks issue, an appellate
court has knowledge of possible falsehoods in the affidavit that the
magistrate judge may not have known of, and this knowledge base
supports the argument that no deference to the magistrate is
required. 1
87
If a defendant is denied a Franks hearing at the trial level, he will
have a difficult time under the clearly erroneous standard to persuade
the appellate court to grant him that hearing and to be successful if a
hearing is granted. 188 "In short, unless an officer admits under oath
that he committed perjury in procuring the affidavit and intended
thereby to mislead the magistrate, a defendant will almost never
184. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559-60 (1988) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114
(1985)).
185. Id.
186. Serr, supra note 71, at 561.
187. Id.
188. Simon, supra note 15, at 1134 n. 134.
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prevail at a Franks hearing ..... [E]ven intent to deceive may be
subject to a kind of harmless error."'' 89
Despite the foregoing arguments in favor of the de novo standard
of review, there also exists persuasive arguments against its adoption,
predominantly based on the factual nature of a Franks hearing.19
0
First, using a de novo standard forces the appellate court to make a
fact-based inquiry without allowing it access to the witnesses and
testimony accessible to the trial court. 191 Second, several courts, like
the one in Mancari, find no legal determination implicit in a Franks
hearing, which denies the hearing the same analysis given to legal
issues. 19
2
An appellate court does not hear witness testimony or consider the
facts of a case as closely as the trial court does.' 93 Hence, allowing
the appellate court to decide a factually-based inquiry based only on
documents from the lower court, without full access to the facts
presented in a witness's testimony, is unjust to both parties
involved. 194 This intense, factual inquiry is better left to the court that
has full access to the facts and witnesses, not to an appellate court.
195
Likewise, despite the Supreme Court's application of the de novo
standard in Ornelas in its discussion of a warrantless search, the
Seventh Circuit in Mancari reaffirmed the deference given to lower
courts in a Franks hearing. 196 Specifically, it stated, "A showing that
a warrant was based on a false statement requires an examination of
historical facts. . ." and requires no examination of the eventual legal
determinations.' 97 The court then went on to note that it agreed with
the First Circuit in refusing to apply a de novo standard of review to
such a factual analysis as a Franks hearing requires. 98
189. Id.
190. See generally infra Part V.C.
191. Seesupra Part II.B.1.
192. See infra Part V.C.
193. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
194. See id.
195. Seeid.
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D. De Novo with Due Deference
In response to the argument that the de novo standard of review
does not give the lower courts proper deference, some argue in favor
of the de novo standard with due deference. 199 In the case of Ornelas
v. United States, the court considered what degree of deference
should be given to a lower court's determinations of reasonable
suspicion and probable cause.20 0 It held:
[A]s a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and
probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal. Having
said this, we hasten to point out that a reviewing court should
take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear
error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts
by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.20'
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures.202 A warrant allows an impartial magistrate to determine if
probable cause exists for an arrest or a search.20 3 Having probable
cause is only one factor in determining whether to suppress evidence
gathered pursuant to a search warrant.20
4
The Supreme Court decision in Franks v. Delaware reversed the
Supreme Court of Delaware's holding that a criminal defendant never
has the right to challenge the veracity of information in a search
warrant. 205 A defendant may:
199. David Holesinger, Note, The End of Backdoor Search: Using Ornelas's Review Standard to
Prevent Illegal Searches Based on Falsely Sworn Police Affidavits, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 737 (2007).
200. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996).
201. Id. at 699.
202. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
203. Alexander & Amsden, supra note 13, at 728.
204. See United States v. Fields, No. 98-5798, 2000 WL 1140557, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 4, 2000).
205. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156-71 (1978).
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[O]btain [a] Franks hearing to explore [the] validity of [the]
search warrant affidavit . [by] mak[ing] a substantial
preliminary showing: (1) that affidavit contained some material
false statement; (2) that affiant made this false statement
intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth; and (3) that
the false statement was necessary to support a finding of
probable cause.20 6
If at the Franks hearing the defendant proves his allegations by a
preponderance of the evidence and if the remaining affidavits are
insufficient to a finding of probable cause without the false affidavit,
the court must declare the warrant invalid and the evidence from the
search will be excluded.2 °7
If a trial court denies the defendant the right to a Franks hearing,
there is a circuit split as to the proper standard of review of that
denial. 208 In United States v. Arbolaez, the Eleventh Circuit
recognized this split, but refused to lay out a proper standard of
review.2 09 The circuits recognize three possible standards of review
for a district court's denial of a Franks hearing.
210
The de novo standard gives the lower court's determination no
deference. 211 The review for abuse of discretion standard considers if
the trial court failed to exercise "sound, reasonable, and legal
discretion that is clearly against logic.' 212 Using the clear error
standard, the reviewing court will only overturn the lower court's
findings if they are clearly erroneous. 2
13
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have adopted the de novo standard of
review, finding that the fast pace of the trial system better positions
courts of appeal to produce accurate legal decisions. 2 14 The First,
206. Wakefield, supra note 72.
207. Franks, 438 U.S. at 156.
208. United States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.2d 1283, 1293 (11 th Cir. 2006).
209. Id.
210. See supra Part 11I.B (discussing the de novo, review for abuse, and clear error standards).
211. Kocoras, supra note 13, at 1416.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1415.
214. See supra Part IV.A.
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Second, and Seventh Circuits have adopted the clear error standard of
review primarily because these courts have found that the trial court
is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate and weigh
the evidence.2
15
Those who argue in favor of the de novo standard of review find
that even though it is logical to give the magistrate judge deference
for probable cause, this consideration does not exist for a Franks
hearing because the magistrate had no knowledge of possible
falsities. 216 Further, mandating the clear error standard puts the
defendant at a considerable disadvantage.217
However, factual and policy arguments weigh in favor of the
Eleventh Circuit's adoption of the clear error standard of review.
218
First, courts find that review of a denial of a Franks hearing is a
question of fact, and not of law, so the de novo standard is not
appropriate.219 Second, consistent with a challenge to a finding of
probable cause, the clear error standard of review allows the
reviewing court to use a totality of the circumstances approach.22 °
Likewise, policy considerations weigh in favor of a clear error
standard.221 First, the Supreme Court in Franks articulated a
presumption in favor of the search warrant, and using the deferential
clear error standard of review allows the courts to maintain this
presumption.222 Second, the trial court has more opportunity to
consider the evidence than does the appellate court, thereby
minimizing possible judicial error.223
215. See supra Part IV.B.
216. Serf, supra note 71, at 561.
217. Simon, supra note I5, at 1134 n.134.
218. See supra Part V.A-B.
219. See United States v. Mancari, 463 F.3d 590, 593-94 (7th Cir. 2006).
220. See United States v. Kinstler, 812 F.2d 522, 525 (9th Cir. 1987).
221. See supra Part V.B.
222. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
223. Kocoras, supra note 13, at 1417.
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20081 CLEAR ERROR FOR DENIAL OF FRANKS HEARING 871
Given considerations of both standards, it is likely that the
Eleventh Circuit will adopt the clear error standard of review to
determine whether a trial court correctly denied a defendant the right
to a Franks hearing.
Brittany H. Southerland
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